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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Rebecca Lee Ahlers–Schaper, appearing pro se, appeals her conviction
for possession of methamphetamine.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On April 25, 2014, Ahlers–Schaper was pulled over for driving with a
suspended license, and was arrested for Driving Without Privileges. (R. vol. I, p.
29.) When asked whether she had anything illegal she admitted that she had a
methamphetamine pipe in her purse. (R. vol. I, p. 29.) The arresting officer
searched Ahlers–Schaper’s purse and found a pipe and a clear plastic bag
containing methamphetamine. (R. vol. I, pp. 29-30; 06/10/15 Trial Tr., p. 46, Ls.
4-10, p. 66, Ls. 1-8.) Ahlers–Schaper was charged by complaint with felony
possession of a controlled substance in case number CR-2014-4915. (R. vol. I,
p. 25.)1
That case was set for preliminary hearing on October 8, 2014, and was
continued to October 22, 2014. (R. vol. I, p. 26.) At the second hearing, Ahlers–
Schaper requested that the court dismiss the case, and the State did not object
to dismissal without prejudice. (R. vol. I, p. 26.) The state refiled the felony

1

Ahlers–Schaper alleges numerous facts on appeal that are not supported by
the record, ranging from complaints about the Washington State Department of
Transportation, to allegations that law enforcement “placed a pipe amongst my
personal possessions.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 1-4.) Any claimed errors
stemming from these unsupported facts should not be considered. State v.
Floyd, 159 Idaho 370, __, 360 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2015) (“In the absence of
an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, we will not
presume error.”).
1

charge as this case, CR-2014-6874, and a summons was issued on October 29,
2014. (R. vol. I, pp. 35-38.)
Ahlers–Schaper made her initial appearance before a magistrate on
December 5, 2014. (R. vol. I, p. 44.) She informed the court that she wished to
be “assisted” by the public defender, but that she didn’t want them to “represent”
her. (R. vol. I, p. 44.) The magistrate appointed the public defender but clarified
on the order that “*NOTE – she wants it as standby counsel only.” (R. vol. I, p.
46.)
Ahlers–Schaper’s preliminary hearing was held on December 24, 2014.
(R. vol. I, pp. 63-64.) Ahlers–Schaper began that hearing by objecting to her
standby counsel, and stating that she did not request a public defender to “speak
for” her. (R. vol. I, p. 63.) She alleged that she and her counsel could not agree
on what was necessary in her defense, and that her standby counsel refused to
assist her. (R. vol. I, pp. 63-64.) After noting that Ahlers–Schaper was verbally
“abusing” her counsel, the magistrate concluded that Ahlers–Schaper wanted to
represent herself, and excused her attorney.2 (R. vol. I, p. 64.) The preliminary
hearing proceeded, with Ahlers–Schaper representing herself, and she was
bound over after a finding of probable cause. (R. vol. I, pp. 64-65.)
Ahlers–Schaper appeared for arraignment, pro se, on January 1, 2015.
(R. vol. I, p. 67.) She indicated that she was trying to obtain counsel, so the court
continued the hearing. (R. vol. I, p. 67.) Ahlers–Schaper appeared, again pro
se, on January 20, 2015. (R. vol. I, p. 68.) That hearing was also continued,
2

The magistrate later entered an order, nunc pro tunc to December 24, formally
vacating the appointment of the public defender. (R. vol. I, p. 66.)
2

again to give Ahlers–Schaper more time to find counsel. (R. vol. I, p. 68.) When
Ahlers–Schaper was finally arraigned, on February 2, 2015, she had still not
found counsel. (02/02/15 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 2-5.) Ahlers–Schaper explained that she
was still trying to contact a group to represent her, and when asked by the district
court whether she was “confident [she was] going to get legal help,” Ahlers–
Schaper responded, “Yeah.” (02/02/15 Tr., p. 4, L. 6 – p. 5, L. 8.) The district
court entered a not-guilty plea, and set trial and pre-trial dates. (02/02/15 Tr., p.
5, Ls. 9-24.)
On April 24, 2015, Ahlers–Schaper appeared, still pro se, at her pretrial
conference. (04/24/15 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 4-12.) She informed the court she wanted
counsel, “but I can’t afford to hire him.” (4/24/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 23 – p. 11, L. 2.)
The district court told Ahlers–Schaper that “we’ve gone a number of months. You
need counsel. You can’t afford counsel. We need to get this case moving.”
(04/24/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 10-12.) In light of this the district court appointed the
public defender as counsel. (04/24/15 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 9-12.)
Another pretrial conference was held on May 22, 2015. (05/22/15 Tr., p.
3, Ls. 2-6.) The district court clarified at the outset of that hearing that the public
defender had been appointed as actual counsel, and not as standby counsel,
and Ahlers–Schaper’s counsel agreed that she “didn’t take it that [she] was
standby.”

(05/22/15 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 7-22.)

Ahlers–Schaper objected to the

appointment of counsel, “for a number of reasons,” and explained to the court
that she wanted her counsel removed from her case. (05/22/15 Tr., p. 3, L. 23 –
p. 4, L. 1, p. 5, Ls. 1-4.) Ahlers–Schaper also stated, “Your Honor I would rather

3

represent myself than have Ms. Whitney represent me. Or come with an
attorney.” (05/22/15 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 9-11.) But not long after that she stated, “Your
Honor, I further request new counsel.” (05/22/15 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 23-24.)
The district court denied the request for new counsel, and explained, “You
can’t have it both ways. You just said you wanted to represent yourself.”
(05/22/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 25 – p. 8, L. 1.) The district court further stated, “This is
your counsel. I don’t appoint new counsel because you have some kind of—
because there have been some personality conflicts. You have competent
counsel.” (05/22/15 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 4-7.) Ahlers–Schaper informed the court that
she “refuse[s] to work with Ms. Whitney,” and again asked the court to remove
her appointed counsel. (05/22/15 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 16-17, p. 8, L. 25 – p. 9, L. 2.)
The court replied:
And that’s been denied. Several times now. Your choices are to
have the public defender’s office, that’s our county public
defender’s office, represent you, or to represent yourself or to hire
your own attorney.
(05/22/15 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 3-7.) Ahlers–Schaper responded, “Well, then I will hire my
own.” (05/22/15 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 8-9.)
Ahlers–Schaper ultimately did not hire her own attorney, and continued to
be represented by the public defender. Despite having an attorney, Ahlers–
Schaper filed numerous motions on her own, three days prior to trial. (R. vol. I,
pp. 125-200.) This included a “Motion to Dismiss I.C. 19-3501(1) and Lack Of
Jurisdiction,” which alleged statutory speedy trial violations. (R. vol. I, pp. 196200.)

4

Ahlers–Schaper’s case went to trial.

(R. vol. I, pp. 201-04; R. vol. II,

pp. 258-66.) The morning of trial, prior to jury selection, the court denied Ahlers–
Schaper’s various self-filed motions. (06/08/15 Trial Tr., p. 2, Ls. 12-17.) After
the jury was selected, and again despite still being represented by the public
defender, Ahlers–Schaper filed another motion on her own, this time to disqualify
the court for cause. (R. vol. II, p. 231-39.) The jury ultimately found Ahlers–
Schaper guilty of possession of methamphetamine. (R. vol. II, p. 269.)
After trial, Ahlers–Schaper continued to file her own motions, including a
Motion To Arrest Judgment For Lack Of Jurisdiction, and a Motion For New Trial
For Lack Of Jurisdiction And Lack Of And Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel And
Due Process Fundamental Errors. (R. vol. II, pp. 271-82, 301-13.) At a hearing
on July 21, her attorney confirmed that she “had nothing to do with these
motions.” (07/21/15 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 6-9.) Ahlers–Schaper continued to object to
being represented by the public defender, and counsel moved to withdraw, which
the court granted. (07/21/15 Tr., p. 26, L. 6 – p. 27, L. 5.) The district court
denied Ahlers–Schaper’s motion to disqualify the court for cause, denied the
motion “to arrest judgement,” and denied the motion for a new trial. (07/21/15
Tr., p. 34, L. 24 – p. 35, L. 14.)
Ahlers–Schaper appeared pro se for sentencing on September 1, 2015,
and was sentenced to three years probation, with one year fixed. (09/01/15 Tr.,
p. 42, Ls. 4-6, p. 61, Ls. 17-21.) She timely appealed. (R. vol. II, pp. 342-45.)

5

ISSUES
Ahlers–Schaper states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Is the “state of Idaho” recognized to be the constitutional
State of Idaho, pursuant to Admission Bill of the State of
Idaho, 26 Stat. 215, chapter 656, July 3rd, 1890?

2.

Did Magistrate Julian deny Appellant counsel/standby
counsel at the preliminary hearing of December 24th, 2014
in derogation of the Appellant’s right to counsel?

3.

Did Judge Buchanan abuse her discretion in failing to
provide conflict free and competent counsel to the
Appellant?

4.

Is there subject matter jurisdiction in accord with the
Constitution of the State of Idaho and Constitution for the
United States of America?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over Ahlers–
Schaper?

2.

Did the district court correctly deny Ahlers–Schaper’s untimely
motion to dismiss for statutory speedy trial violations?

3.

Has Ahlers–Schaper failed to show that the removal of her standby
counsel was a violation of her 6th amendment rights?

4.

Has Ahlers–Schaper failed to show that her counsel had a conflict
of interest?

5.

Has Ahlers–Schaper failed to establish fundamental error on her
unpreserved claim that the district court erred by not immediately
hearing her motion to disqualify for cause?

6.

Is Ahlers–Schaper entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

6

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Ahlers–Schaper
A.

Introduction
Ahlers–Schaper claims, via several theories, that the district court did not

have subject matter jurisdiction over her.3

Ahlers–Schaper first argues that

initiating a criminal case via complaint is unconstitutional, and thus concludes
that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over her. (Appellant’s
brief, p. 11.)
Ahlers–Schaper also appears to argue, as best can be gathered from her
briefing, that the Idaho Code is unconstitutional and invalid wherever it uses
“state of Idaho” to refer to state action, as opposed to “State of Idaho.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-21.) Because much of the Idaho Code and criminal
rules use the phrase “state of Idaho,” Ahlers–Schaper submits that “there is no
political, legal, judicial, jurisdiction for the ‘state of Idaho’ for which the basis of a
criminal action to even exist against the Appellant ….” (Appellant’s brief, p. 21.4)
Ahlers–Schaper’s jurisdictional arguments fail. This case was properly
initiated by criminal complaint, and her notion that “there is no political, legal,

3

Ahlers–Schaper couched several claims as challenges for “lack of jurisdiction”
more generally. But some of those claims do not seem to relate to subject matter
jurisdiction. Specifically, Ahlers–Schaper claims the district court had no
jurisdiction because it allegedly failed to address her motion for disqualification,
and because her preliminary hearing was allegedly untimely. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 6-11.) While these two claims arguably touch on the district’s court’s ability to
hear her case, they do not specifically concern subject matter jurisdiction, and
are therefore taken up infra in sections II and V.
4

Quotations from the Appellant’s brief will be sic throughout.
7

judicial, jurisdiction for the ‘state of Idaho’” has no basis in law or fact. The district
court consequently had subject matter jurisdiction over Ahlers–Schaper.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised

at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.”

State v.

Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citations omitted).
C.

The Case Against Ahlers–Schaper Was Properly Initiated By A Criminal
Complaint
Subject matter jurisdiction, broadly defined, is a court’s “power to hear and

determine cases.” State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132
(2004) (citing Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950)).
The Rogers Court explained this well-settled principle:
Article 5, Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution provides that the
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law
and in equity. Idaho Code, § 1–705 grants the district court original
jurisdiction in all cases and proceedings. “It is a familiar and wellsettled principle of law that the indictment must allege that the
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.” The
information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter
jurisdiction upon the court. Subject matter jurisdiction to try a
defendant and impose a sentence is never waived. The district
court acquired subject matter jurisdiction over Rogers on August 4,
1993, when the State filed the criminal complaint.
Id. (internal citations omitted, emphasis added.)

Moreover, “[g]enerally, once

acquired by the court, jurisdiction continues until extinguished by some event.”
Id. (citing McHugh v. McHugh, 115 Idaho 198, 199, 766 P.2d 133, 134 (1988);
Ward v. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 41, 720 P.2d 223, 224 (Ct. App 1986).)

8

Here, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Ahlers–
Schaper. Ahlers–Schaper was charged with possession of methamphetamine
within Idaho. (R. vol. I, pp. 35-36, 61-62.) Per Rogers, because there was an
“information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within
the State of Idaho” the district court accordingly had subject matter jurisdiction
over Ahlers–Schaper.
Ahlers–Schaper argues that the complaint somehow diminished the
district court’s jurisdiction, but this fundamentally misses the mark; here, the court
had subject matter jurisdiction because of the complaint. Her mistake in claiming
that a case may only be initiated by indictment or information stems from
misreading the Idaho Constitution—the relevant constitutional provision does not
refer to the “initiation” of a case, but rather states that “[n]o person shall be held
to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment
or indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor ….” Idaho
Const. art. I, § 8. Idaho cases and statutes show that “held to answer” is a
reference to a defendant’s arraignment:
If, after hearing the evidence adduced at the preliminary
examination, the magistrate finds that a public offense has been
committed, and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe
the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate shall enter an order
holding the defendant to answer to said public offense.
I.C. § 19-815 (emphasis added); see also State v. Hendricks, 80 Idaho 344, 348,
330 P.2d 334, 336 (1958). What happened here was exactly what the
constitution requires: the state filed a complaint, then filed an information prior to
Ahlers–Schaper being held to answer at her arraignment.

9

Ahlers–Schaper’s

arguments to the contrary, and her arguments that the district court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction, fail.
D.

Ahlers–Schaper’s Theories Regarding Capitalized Letters In State Names
Are Meritless, And Have No Bearing On Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Ahlers–Schaper also presented lengthy argument below, and on appeal,

that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it is created by
the Idaho Code, which refers to the state of Idaho as a lowercase “state of
Idaho,” as opposed to a capitalized “State of Idaho.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 1121.) Ahlers–Schaper claims that “the legislative department of the State of Idaho
is derogation of [federal and/or constitutional law], when they use the term ‘state
of Idaho.’” (Appellant’s brief, p. 14.) She accordingly alleges that laws passed
“for a non-existent ‘state of Idaho’” are without effect, and explains:
What supposed State laws are we talking about? Pretty much
everything that was not passed by the Territory of Idaho after July
3rd, 1890, and which is not in conflict with the Constitution of the
State of Idaho.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.) Ahlers–Schaper concludes that:
The bottom line here is that there is no political, legal, judicial,
jurisdiction for the “state of Idaho” for which the basis of a criminal
action to even exist against the Appellant, pursuant to the
Admission Bill of the State of Idaho, 26 Stat. 215, Chapter 656, July
3rd, 1890.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 21.)
Ahlers–Schaper cites no legal authority affirming this theory, because
there is none; therefore, her argument that the lack of capital letters in “state of
Idaho” negates statutes, fails. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d
966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of
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law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered . . . . A party waives an
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are
lacking.”).
The Idaho Constitution vests legislative power in a senate and house of
representatives, and gives the legislature the power to prescribe lower-court
jurisdiction. Idaho Const. art. III, § 1, art. V, § 2. That same Constitution vests
judicial power in Idaho’s courts, including its district courts. Idaho Const. art V,
§ 2. Contrary to Ahlers–Schaper’s claims, the legislature’s use of a lower-case
“s” does not nullify an otherwise constitutional statute, or affect the district court’s
jurisdiction over her.5 See generally State v. L’Abbe, 156 Idaho 317, 318-21, 324
P.3d 1016, 1017-20 (Ct. App. 2014).
The district court had lawful jurisdiction over Ahlers–Schaper’s case and
denied her claims to the contrary. It did so correctly.
II.
The District Court Correctly Denied Ahlers–Schaper’s Untimely Motion To
Dismiss For Statutory Speedy Trial Violations
A.

Introduction
Ahlers–Schaper moved to dismiss this case for an alleged statutory6

speedy trial violation, and she raises that issue again on appeal. Her claim is

5

The state also notes that this very Court is also creation of the state of Idaho.
I.C. § 1-101 (providing that “The following are the courts of justice of this state: 1.
The Supreme Court. 2. The Court of Appeals. 3. The district courts ….”).
6

Ahlers–Schaper’s brief refers to constitutional authorities and cites her 6th
amendment rights, but the specific error she claims is statutory: she alleges that
an information was not filed within six months of her arrest as required by
I.C. § 19-3501. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-11.) She presents no argument or
analysis supporting a constitutional, as opposed to statutory, violation of her right
11

that because the information was not filed within six months of the arrest in her
original case, that this case was therefore required to be dismissed per I.C. § 193501. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9–11.)
This argument fails for two reasons.

First, the district court correctly

denied Ahlers–Schaper’s speedy trial motion as a procedural matter, because
her motion was not timely filed pursuant to Rule 12(b). In the alternative, Ahlers–
Schaper’s argument fails as a matter of substance, because her preliminary
hearing was held within six months of the summons in this case, and was
therefore compliant with I.C. § 19-3501. The district court therefore correctly
denied her motion to dismiss.
B.

Standard Of Review

Trial court orders on motions to dismiss are reviewed using an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 184, 45 P.3d 838, 840 (2002).
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d
931, 933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 852, 153 P.3d 1195, 1198 (Ct.
App. 2006). The appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact that are
supported by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews the trial
court’s application of the law to the facts. Avila, 143 Idaho at 852, 153 P.3d at
1198.

to a speedy trial, and does not claim that the trial itself was untimely. To the
extent Ahlers–Schaper means to frame her “speedy preliminary hearing” or
“speedy information” claim in constitutional terms she has not supported it with
argument on appeal, and has therefore waived that issue. Zichko, 129 Idaho at
263, 923 P.2d at 970.
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C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Ahlers–Schaper’s Motion To Dismiss,
Because Her Motion Was Not Timely Filed
Per the Idaho Criminal Rules, defense objections that are “capable of

determination without trial of the general issue may be raised before the trial by
motion.” I.C.R. 12(b). Rule 12(b) motions “must be filed within twenty-eight (28)
days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days before trial whichever
is earlier.” I.C.R. 12(e). Trial courts may extend these deadlines for pretrial
motions, but “only ‘for good cause shown, or for excusable neglect.’” I.R.E. 12(e).
A court may not arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the filing requirements
of the rule. To permit a court to do so without the required
exempting factors would emasculate the intent of the rule. Pretrial
motions are just that, motions to be disposed of prior to trial.
Bringing such motions at the last minute unfairly deprives the
responding party opportunity to gather evidence to meet the merits
of the movant’s arguments.
State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888, 712 P.2d 585, 589 (1985). Accordingly, it is
an abuse of discretion for a district court to consider a Rule 12(b) motion “which,
for no good reason, was not timely filed.” See id.
Here, on June 5, the Friday afternoon before the Monday trial, Ahlers–
Schaper filed a “Motion To Dismiss I.C 19-3501(1) and Lack of Jurisdiction,”
alleging statutory speedy trial violations.7 (R. vol. I, pp. 196–200.) The motion
asserted a violation of I.C. § 19-3501(1) because the information had not been
filed within six months of the arrest. (Id.) The district court took up that motion,
and several others, the morning of trial:
THE COURT: Miss Ahlers–Schaper, we—you’re here this morning
for trial. I note know that you have—you have filed a number of
7

That same motion, in substantially similar form, was also filed with this Court on
appeal, and denied on May 12, 2016.
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motions filed Friday afternoon pro se, they got filed on your own
behalf even though you have counsel. The motions are not timely,
and the motions are denied.
(06/08/15 Trial Tr., p. 2, Ls. 12-17.)
The district court correctly concluded that the motion was not timely filed,
and did not abuse its discretion by denying it.

Ahlers–Schaper entered a

not-guilty plea at her arraignment February 2, 2015, and trial began on June 8,
2015. (02/02/15 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 9-24; R. vol. I, p. 201.) Ahlers–Schaper’s motion
was a defense or objection “based on [alleged] defects in the prior proceedings in
the prosecution” under I.C.R. (12)(b)(1). Per Idaho Criminal Rule 12(e), Ahlers–
Schaper was required to file her motion to dismiss “within twenty-eight (28) days
after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days before trial whichever is
earlier.” The earlier of those dates was twenty-eight days after Ahlers–Schaper’s
entry of plea on February 2; thus, Ahlers–Schaper’s motion to dismiss was
required to be filed by March 1, 2015. Instead, Ahlers–Schaper filed her motion
months later, on June 5—the Friday afternoon prior to a Monday trial—which
made it 96 days late. (R. vol. I, p. 196.) Because her motion was not filed on
time, and because neither Ahlers–Schaper nor her counsel presented good
cause or excusable neglect for the late filing, the district court correctly denied it.
Ahlers–Schaper attempts to bypass these timeliness requirements by
framing her motion to dismiss as a jurisdictional claim. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 911.) She reasons that her motion “was brought timely as Motions challenging the
jurisdiction can be brought at any time.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) This argument
fails because, regardless of how she styles her motion, it is not jurisdictional—it
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simply concerns state compliance with statutory speedy trial provisions. And
Ahlers–Schaper does not show how the state’s alleged failure to follow such a
statutory provision would deprive or otherwise extinguish the district court’s
ongoing jurisdiction. Ahlers–Schaper’s motion was therefore required to be filed
on time; because it was not, the district court did not err in denying it.
D.

Even If Ahlers–Schaper’s Motion To Dismiss Was Timely Filed, She
Incorrectly Calculates The Time For State Compliance With I.C. § 193501, And Her Motion Was Thus Correctly Denied As A Matter Of
Substance
Ahlers–Schaper’s motion to dismiss was untimely, and that alone is a

basis for denying it. But even if this Court determines the motion was timely filed,
it nevertheless fails on substantive grounds. In her motion, Ahlers–Schaper
alleged that the state did not file the information within six months after the arrest
date in the original case, which she claims subjects the current case to dismissal
per I.C. § 19-3501(1). (Appellant’s brief, p. 9; R. vol. I, pp. 196–200.) This is
incorrect for the simple reason that the time for filing the information did not begin
with the arrest in the dismissed original case; rather, it began with the filing of the
summons in this case.
The Court of Appeals addressed this very situation in State v. Mason,
where a felony complaint was dismissed and refiled, and the appellant “was
summoned to appear again.” State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 661, 726 P.2d 772,
774 (Ct. App. 1986).

The appellant argued, among other things, that his

statutory speedy trial rights were violated. Id. at 663, 726 P.2d at 775. The
Court of Appeals considered his claim and clarified how the timing worked:
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Subsection (1) of I.C. § 19–3501 deals with the pretrial time frame
from arrest to the filing of an indictment or information. It requires
dismissal of the charge when no indictment or information is filed
within six months of the defendant’s arrest. In this case, the
information was filed six months and three days after Mason's
arrest at the scene of the altercation. However, the original charge
against Mason was dismissed on May 9, 1984. Rather than being
rearrested, Mason received a summons to appear. Consequently,
there was no second “arrest” to restart the running of the statute's
six-month time limit. Because Mason was ordered to appear and
answer for the charge of aggravated assault, we believe that the
service of the summons was the functional equivalent of an arrest.
Thus, the statutory clock began to run anew. The information was
filed within six months of the service of the summons. Thus, we
hold that I.C. § 19–3501(1) was not violated.
Id. at 663, 726 P.2d at 775 (internal citations omitted).
Ahlers–Schaper’s statutory speedy trial arguments are quickly disposed of
by the Mason Court’s holding. Here, Ahlers–Schaper’s original case was
dismissed, this case was filed, and a summons was issued on October 29, 2014
(R. vol. I, pp. 13, 25-34, 37-38.) Per Mason, the issuance of the summons
restarted the statutory clock and the state had six months thereafter to file an
information. And the state did exactly that, when it went to preliminary hearing
and filed the information on December 24, 2015—well within the six-month
timeframe. (R. vol. I, pp. 61-65.) Because the state had six months from the
summons in this case to comply with I.C. § 19-3501(1), and did so, there was no
statutory speedy trial violation here. Consequently, Ahlers–Schaper’s speedy
trial motion fails as a matter of substance.
The district court had both procedural and substantive grounds to deny
Ahlers–Schaper’s motion to dismiss based on statutory speedy trial violations. It
did so correctly.
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III.
Ahlers–Schaper Has Failed To Show That The Removal Of Her Standby
Counsel Was A Violation Of Her 6th Amendment Rights
A.

Introduction
Ahlers–Schaper argues that the magistrate abused his discretion by

removing her counsel prior to preliminary hearing, and claims that doing so
“violated a court’s order and Appellant’s right to standby counsel ….”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-28.) This is incorrect, because the magistrate correctly
removed Ahlers–Schaper’s standby counsel as a discretionary matter due to
Ahlers–Schaper’s behavior and her statements that she wished to represent
herself.

Moreover, Ahlers–Schaper has no constitutional “right to standby

counsel.” Consequently, Ahlers–Schaper has failed to show that the removal of
her standby counsel was an abuse of discretion, or a violation of her 6th
amendment rights.
B.

Standard of Review
The state submits that the scope of Ahlers–Schaper’s putative “right to

standby counsel” is a question of law over which “this Court exercises free
review.” See Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111
(2004) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)). A
district court’s decision whether to appoint standby counsel is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 886, 136
P.3d 350, 357 (Ct. App. 2006).
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C.

The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion By Removing Ahlers–
Schaper’s Standby Counsel, And Ahlers–Schaper Had No Constitutional
Right To Standby Counsel
Indigent defendants have a right to court-appointed counsel, pursuant to

both the “Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.” State v. Suiter, 138 Idaho 662, 665, 67
P.3d 1274, 1277 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
342-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-97, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 803-05 (1963); Pharris v. State, 91
Idaho 456, 458, 424 P.2d 390, 392 (1967).)
However, defendants do not have a constitutional right to standby
counsel. The Idaho Court of Appeals considered this very question, where the
appellant argued that “he has a fundamental right to standby counsel.” Averett,
142 Idaho at 886, 136 P.3d at 357. The Court disagreed, and noted that the
appellant “failed to provide authority for the proposition that the district court is
constitutionally required to accommodate a defendant's wish to represent himself
with the advice of standby counsel at the government's expense in order to avoid
a violation of his right to appointed counsel.” Id. The Averett Court accordingly
concluded:
We agree that the appointment of standby counsel should be
encouraged when a defendant elects to proceed to trial pro se. We
find no authority, however, to support Averett’s proposition that the
district court was constitutionally mandated to appoint standby
counsel at Averett’s request. Thus, we hold that the appointment of
standby counsel is discretionary and not a matter of constitutional
right.
Id.
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Here, the magistrate did not abuse his discretion by removing Ahlers–
Schaper’s standby counsel, because he reasonably concluded that Ahlers–
Schaper no longer wanted her standby counsel to represent her. The preliminary
hearing minutes show the hearing began with a proclamation from Ahlers–
Schaper regarding her standby counsel:
[Ahlers–Schaper]:
HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY; I DID NOT REQUEST A PUBLIC
DEFENDER TO SPEAK FOR ME; REQUESTED ASSIST ME IN
MY OWN REPRESENTATION; CONTACTED MS WHITNEY FOR
FIRST MEETING ON 22ND; FIRST TIME I WAS ABLE TO MEET
WITH HER; SHE WAS NOT ABLE – THE ATTORNEY AND I DID
NOT AGREE ON WHAT WAS NECESSARY FOR ME TO
WE DIDN’T AGREE ON WHAT WAS NECESSARY IN MY
DEFENSE
[Judge]:
LET ME CUT TO THE CHASE
IF IT WAS ME, YOU EITHER HAVE AN ATTORNEY OR YOU
WOULDN’T; WOULDN’T PLAY THIS GAME
EITHER HAVE ONE IN FULL SENSE OR NOT
JUST LEADS TO STUFF I’M HEARING NOW
IF YOU DON’T WANT AN ATTORNEY I’LL EXCUSE MS
WHITNEY RIGHT NOW
SHE HAS BETTER THINGS TO DO THAN LISTEN TO YOU
WHINE ABOUT
YOU CAN EITHER HAVE ATTORNEY OR GO HIRE ATTORNEY
NOT GOING TO HAVE
PROCEEDING OR UTILIZE SERVICE OF AN ATTORNEY
WITHOUT BADMOUTHING
[Ahlers–Schaper]:
REFUSED TO ASSIST ME WHEN I WENT IN THERE
[Judge]:
THAT’S INCONSISTENT WITH STATEMENTS YOU MADE
PREVIOUSLY
WANT TO REPRESENT YOURSELF
I DON’T HAVE TOLERANCE FOR THAT NONSENSE
MS WHITNEY IF YOU WANT TO BE EXCUSED
[Ahlers–Schaper’s Standby Counsel]:
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WOULD LIKE TO BE EXCUSED
[Judge]:
YOU’RE ABUSING ATTORNEY
YOU WANT TO REPRESENT YOURSELF
WE’RE PROCEEDING
[Ahlers–Schaper]:
I ASKED FOR COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY WHO WOULD
ASSIST ME IN MY CASE
[Judge]:
YOU’VE HAD THAT AND ALL YOU CAN DO IS SIT THERE AND
BAD MOUTH HER
I DON’T TOLERATE THIS
YOU DON’T APPRECIATE WHAT YOU’VE BEEN GIVEN
[Ahlers–Schaper]:
I HAVE RIGHT TO REPRESENT MYSELF; ALSO HAVE RIGHT
TO COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY
[Judge]:
YOU HAVE RIGHT TO ONE OR THE OTHER
YOUR ATTORNEY EXCUSED
(R. vol. I, pp. 63-64.)

The magistrate later entered an order vacating the

appointment of the public defender, nunc pro tunc, formally removing Ahlers–
Schaper’s standby counsel. (R. vol. I, p. 66.)
The magistrate did not abuse his discretion by entering this order,
because he based the decision to remove Ahlers–Schaper’s standby counsel on
her plain statements that she did not request a public defender to speak for her,
and that she and her standby counsel didn’t agree on what was necessary in her
defense. Moreover, the magistrate noted that Ahlers–Schaper was “abusing” her
attorney, and that despite having standby counsel, that Ahlers–Schaper was “bad
mouthing” her counsel. Given all of these facts, the magistrate could reasonably
conclude that Ahlers–Schaper no longer wanted the assistance of her standby
20

counsel, or was being abusive to her counsel, and in either case reasonably
removed her standby counsel as a matter of discretion.
Ahlers–Schaper argued below, and argues now, that the removal of her
standby counsel violated her right to standby counsel. (R. vol. II, pp. 276, 302;
Appellant’s brief, p. 23.) This argument fails in light of Averett. Contrary to
Ahlers–Schaper’s claims, she simply has no constitutional “right to standby
counsel.”

The magistrate’s decision to remove Ahlers–Schaper’s standby

counsel was therefore not a violation of Ahlers–Schaper’s constitutional rights.
The magistrate did not abuse his discretion by removing Ahlers–Schaper’s
counsel, nor was Ahlers–Schaper entitled to standby counsel as a matter of
constitutional right. Ahlers–Schaper has therefore failed to show that the
magistrate erred by removing her standby counsel.8

8

Ahlers–Schaper alternatively refers to her “right to standby counsel” and “right
to counsel” in her briefing. (See, e.g., Appellant’s brief, p. 24.) It is unclear
whether she additionally intends to assert that she had a right to appointed
counsel that was violated, in addition to a violation of her putative “right to
standby counsel.” To the extent she intends to present argument relating to
appointed counsel on appeal, the attempt fails, for multiple reasons. First, and
fundamentally, Ahlers–Schaper plainly waived her Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel at multiple points prior to the preliminary hearing. (R. vol. I, p.
44-45 (showing Ahlers–Schaper as saying “I wish to be assisted by public
defender; don’t wish for them to represent me; Wish their assistance,” and “[I]
want court to know [I] don’t want to be represented,” and attesting under oath her
desire “to be assisted by court appointed counsel to represent myself. Request
counsel to stand by in the case I need clarification ….).) Ahlers–Schaper made it
clear that she was initially requesting the assistance of standby counsel only, and
that she did not wish for the public defender to represent her. She was well
within her Farretta rights to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95
S.Ct. 2525, 2541 (1975). Second, as a matter of coherent argument, Ahlers –
Schaper cannot simultaneously claim that she was denied access to appointed
counsel, while claiming her standby counsel erred by filing a notice of
appearance and discovery requests—or in other words, by doing exactly what
appointed counsel would have done at that stage in the case. (See Appellant’s
21

D.

Even If The Magistrate Erred By Removing Ahlers–Schaper’s Standby
Counsel Prior To The Preliminary Hearing, That Error Would Be
Harmless, Because It Had No Effect On Ahlers–Schaper’s Trial
The magistrate did not err by removing Ahlers–Schaper’s standby counsel

prior to the preliminary hearing. But alternatively, even if the magistrate did err,
the removal of counsel would be harmless because it did not affect Ahlers–
Schaper’s trial.
Unlike a denial of counsel at trial, the denial of counsel at preliminary
hearing can be a harmless error. State v. Wuthrich, 112 Idaho 360, 364-65, 732
P.2d 329, 333-34 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90
S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970).) Such an alleged error will be held harmless
when an appellate court is “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” that the denial
of preliminary hearing counsel “did not affect the result in trial.” Wuthrich, 112
Idaho at 364, 732 P.2d at 333.
The Wuthrich Court applied this framework to a case in which the
appellant was “not represented by counsel at the outset of his preliminary
hearing,” but where the appellant “raised no issue pertaining directly to the trial at
which he was found guilty.” Id. at 362, 732 P. 2d at 331. Focusing on the
preliminary hearing, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant was
confused about whether he wished to proceed to preliminary hearing without an
attorney, and that, accordingly, “the magistrate erred by electing to proceed”
without one. Id. at 364, 732 P.2d at 333.

brief, p. 23.) Lastly, even if the magistrate erred by not appointing counsel prior
to her preliminary hearing, this alleged error would be harmless, for all the
reasons discussed in section III.D infra.
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But the Wuthrich Court also concluded that this error was harmless,
because it did not affect the trial outcome:
In this case, during the preliminary hearing, Wuthrich endeavored
ineffectively to cross-examine witnesses, including the victim. At
various junctures in the hearing he made inappropriate and selfdefeating remarks. When Wuthrich’s inability to represent himself
became obvious to the magistrate, the hearing was suspended and
continued to another date. Wuthrich was represented by counsel
when the hearing resumed. Additional opportunity to cross-examine
the victim was provided. Furthermore, the state did not rely at trial
on testimony given at the preliminary hearing. All witnesses called
at the preliminary hearing testified afresh at the trial.
The state’s case was strong. The testimony of the state’s witnesses
was uncontradicted except by Wuthrich himself. We do not find,
and Wuthrich has not identified, any evidence that he could have
challenged more successfully at trial if counsel had been made
available at the outset of the preliminary hearing. Accordingly, we
are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the result of the trial
would have been the same. We conclude that the initial lack of
counsel at the preliminary hearing was harmless error.
Id. at 364-65, 732 P.2d at 333-34.
Here, that same analysis applies, because there is no evidence that the
removal of standby counsel affected Ahlers–Schaper’s trial.

Ahlers–Schaper

was represented by counsel throughout her trial, and the sole witnesses called at
her preliminary hearing “testified afresh” at trial. (R. vol. I, p. 64; 06/10/15 Trial
Tr., pp. 15-48.) Much like the witnesses in Wuthrich, the state’s witnesses here
gave trial testimony that was only contradicted by Ahlers–Schaper. And here
too, a review of the record does not show, nor does Ahlers–Schaper identify, any
evidence “that [she] could have challenged more successfully at trial if counsel
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had been made available at the outset of the preliminary hearing.” 9 Wuthrich,
112 Idaho at 364-65, 732 P.2d at 333-34.
Consequently, even if the magistrate erred by removing standby counsel
prior to the preliminary hearing, that decision did not affect the trial and was
harmless. Ahlers–Schaper fails to show otherwise on appeal.
IV.
Ahlers–Schaper Fails To Show That Her Counsel Had A Conflict Of Interest
A.

Introduction
In what must be an alternate theory, Ahlers–Schaper claims that her

erroneously-removed

counsel

was

also

erroneously

appointed,

despite

“irreconcilable conflicts.”10 (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-27.) Ahlers–Schaper makes

9

Ahlers–Schaper only argues “because I had no access to standby counsel I did
not know the procedures to file motions until after the time had expired to file pretrial motions had run.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2–3.) She also offers the
conclusory statement that “I had no counsel to file motions, which would have
exposed the illegalities of the arrest and subsequent search, which would have
changed the outcome of the case.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 2.) But Ahlers–Schaper
does not explain which motions she did not file, or filed too late, or their legal or
factual bases, or how such motions would have affected the trial—or, critically,
whether the public defender would have even made such filings at Ahlers–
Schaper’s behest. And indeed, Ahlers–Schaper did have pretrial standby
counsel prior to trial, leading up to the day of the preliminary hearing—and no
such outcome-changing pretrial motions were filed by counsel. Ahlers–Schaper
presents no coherent argument that had she had standby counsel in the months
of January and February, that such counsel would have filed meritorious motions
that could have had any impact on the trial.
10

Ahlers–Schaper also argues at length that her standby counsel was not
competent, but these arguments are misplaced. An appellate court will generally
not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel first raised on direct
appeal “because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regularly raise issues
on which no evidence was presented at the defendant’s trial.” State v. Saxton,
133 Idaho 546, 549, 989 P.2d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 1999). “The question of
competency of counsel is an extremely complex factual determination which, in
all but the most unusual cases, requires an evidentiary hearing before
24

the related claim that it was “an abuse of discretion for Judge Buchanan to have
ignored my timely Motion for New Counsel filed before trial ….” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 28.) These arguments fail because there is no evidence that Ahlers–
Schaper’s counsel had a conflict of interest. Moreover, the district court did not
ignore

Ahlers–Schaper’s

repeated

requests

for

substitute counsel,

but

considered them, and correctly denied them as a matter of discretion. Ahlers–
Schaper fails to show this was an error.
B.

Standard of Review
A trial court court’s denial of an indigent defendant’s motion to appoint

substitute counsel is reviewed with an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 (2002). Such an abuse will be found
“when the denial of the motion results in a violation of the defendant’s right to
counsel.” Id.
C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Ahlers–Schaper’s Standby
Counsel Had No Conflict Of Interest, Because There Is No Evidence In
The Record Showing Such A Conflict
While criminal defendants have a constitutional right to counsel, “[t]he right

to counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one’s choice.”
State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594, 181 P.3d 512, 520 (Ct. App. 2007).
Nevertheless, a district court may, “in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney
determination . . . . The resolution of those factual issues for the first time on
appeal, based upon a trial record in which competence of counsel was not at
issue, is at best conjectural.” Id. (quoting Carter v. State, 108 Idaho 788, 791,
702 P.2d 826, 829 (1985) (Bakes, J., specially concurring).) Accordingly,
Ahlers–Schaper’s claims pertaining to her counsel’s competence, and allegedly
ineffective assistance, are clearly more appropriate to a post-conviction
proceeding.
25

for an indigent defendant,” upon a showing of “good cause.” Id. In making this
determination, “[t]he trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair
opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for
substitution of counsel after having been made aware of the problems involved.”
Id. (emphasis in original).
In reviewing such a motion, prejudice to a defendant is only presumed “if
the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting
interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s
performance.’” State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998)
(quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638
(1987).) Such a defendant “bears the burden of showing ‘active representation
of competing interests’ in order to establish a conflict of interest implicating the
protection of the Sixth Amendment.” Wood, 132 Idaho at 98, 967 P.2d at 712.
Moreover, “[i]n addition to showing an active representation of competing
interests, a defendant must show that an actual conflict adversely affected
counsel’s performance.” Id. (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98
S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).)
The applicable conflicts of interest are found in the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct. Wood, 132 Idaho at 98, 967 P.2d at 712. In addition to
specific prohibitions on business dealings and other relationships with clients, the
Rules set out the general definition of a “conflict”:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent
conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
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(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to
another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third
person or by the personal interests of the lawyer,
including family and domestic relationships.
Idaho R. of Prof. Conduct 1.7, 1.8.
Ahlers–Schaper argued below, and now argues on appeal, that her
standby counsel was not “conflict-free.” She claims that:
Over and over at each hearing I made it clear to Judge Buchanan
that there were irreconcilable conflicts with Ms. Whitney being
appointed as counsel. I objected at each hearing, wrote letters to
Judge Buchanan of the irreconcilable conflicts and Judge Buchanan
ignored my issues as she had done with everything else I raised.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 26.) Ahlers–Schaper also presented these “irreconcilable
conflicts” via a Motion To Have New Counsel Appointed In Accord With Law or In
The Alternative Dismiss The Above Entitled Case For Failure To Appoint
Counsel In Accord With Law. (R. vol. I, pp. 130-43, 182-86.) In this motion
Ahlers–Schaper explained her criticisms of counsel in more detail. She alleged
that “[t]he problem has been and continues to be for the most part that the
attorneys in the public defender’s office do not listen to my side of things, nor
give me a voice in what I want them to do for me as I require….” (R. vol. I, p.
141.) She also alleged that “when I complain about it to them, they come into
court and make me the bad guy….” (R. vol. I, p. 141.) She contended “[m]ost
importantly, I expect them to defend motions that I prepare for my defense and
refuse to co-sign them. I need my counsel to be available to meet with me a
regular biases around my busy schedule….” (R. vol. I, p. 142.)
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The district court considered some of these same complaints previously
asserted in a hand-written letter. (R. vol. I, pp. 77-81.) The court replied and
denied the request for new counsel in a letter sent on April 29, 2015:
Dear Ms. Ahlers:
I received and reviewed your letter regarding your request for
appointment of conflict counsel outside the public defender’s office.
I also reviewed your file and listened to the audio of the preliminary
hearing in front of Judge Julian. The request is denied. At your
behest, I reappointed the public defender’s office to represent you
after Judge Julian had dismissed them and ordered that you
represent yourself or hire counsel. I will not appoint conflict counsel
as I do not find there is a conflict. Your options are to work with the
public defender’s office so that they may effectively represent you,
to represent yourself or to hire your own attorney.
R. vol. I, p. 85. The district court similarly denied Ahlers–Schaper’s pre-trial
request for new counsel, and her motion in limine for new counsel. (05/22/15 Tr.,
p. 8, L. 2 – p. 9, L. 7; 06/08/15 Trial Tr., p. 3, L. 21 – p. 4, L. 15.)
The district court correctly found that there was no conflict of interest here.
There is no evidence in the record that Ahlers–Schaper’s counsel had any active
representation of competing interests, much less any evidence that her
performance was adversely affected by such a conflict.

Nor is there any

evidence that Ahlers–Schaper’s counsel had any disqualifying financial interests,
directly adverse representations, or other materially limiting professional or
personal interests or relationships. Moreover, Ahlers–Schaper had a “full and fair
opportunity” to present her facts and reasons in support of her requests for new
counsel, and in fact had several such opportunities: she articulated complaints
about counsel via letter and briefing, and by directly addressing the court at
almost every hearing. (R. vol. I, pp. 77-81, 125-143; 05/22/15 Tr., p. 3, L. 23 – p.
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10, L. 3; 06/08/15 Trial Tr., p. 2, L. 7 – p. 3, L. 13, p. 6, L. 4 – p. 7, L. 24; 07/21/15
Tr., p. 26, L. 8 – p. 27, L. 5) The district court considered Ahlers–Schaper’s
complaints, but, because there was no evidence of a conflict of interest, it
correctly denied her requests for new counsel.
Ahlers–Schaper fails to show error because, while she presents a litany of
complaints about her counsel, she does not point to any evidence of an actual
conflict of interest. (See R. vol. I, pp. 141-42.) It seems that her argument rests
on an erroneously broad definition of “conflict”—one encompassing personal
disputes and disagreements. A review of the record shows that Ahlers–Schaper
and her counsel had extensive disagreements, maybe even irreconcilable ones,
but a conflict in the interpersonal sense is not a legal conflict of interest. Per
Wood, Ahlers–Schaper has the burden of showing that her counsel had a conflict
of interest as defined in the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and she has not
done so. The district court correctly concluded the same.
V.
Ahlers–Schaper Fails To Show That The District Court Erred By Not Immediately
Hearing Her Motion To Disqualify For Cause, Much Less That That Decision
Amounted To Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Ahlers–Schaper submits that the district court erred because her mid-trial

motion to disqualify the judge was not taken up in a timely fashion.11 (Appellant’s

11

The district court ultimately heard this motion in a post-trial hearing and denied
it, explaining to Ahlers–Schaper in its ruling that “I don’t find that you have any
cause to disqualify the Court so I am not denying myself for cause.” (07/21/15
Tr., p. 35, Ls. 7-8.) On appeal, Ahlers–Schaper does not argue that the district
court’s ruling on her motion to disqualify for cause was erroneous. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.) Rather, she challenges only the timing of the ruling.
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brief, pp. 6-9.) Ahlers–Schaper essentially argues that her motion should have
stopped the trial proceedings, and should have been resolved before the court
made any rulings, because after such motions are filed “the Judge in question no
longer has authority to act on the case until the question of Disqualification has
been decided.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
Ahlers–Schaper’s argument on appeal, which was not raised at trial, is
without merit.12 A review of the record shows the district court’s decision to
continue with trial was not improper, much less fundamental error.
B.

Standard of Review
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.”
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245
P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
C.

Ahlers–Schaper Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Court Not
Immediately Taking Up Her Motion, Much Less Fundamental Error
Under the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry, unobjected-to claims

of constitutional error are reviewed using a three-part test:

Because Ahlers–Schaper does not contest the substance of the district court’s
ruling on appeal, she has waived any such argument on appeal, and this
response will accordingly address the claimed procedural error.
12

After trial, Ahlers–Schaper claimed that the district court erred by proceeding
with trial and not immediately taking up her motion to disqualify. (See, e.g.,
07/21/15 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 6-13, 21-25.) However, this objection was not timely
raised during the trial itself.
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(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Consequently, “where an
error has occurred at trial and was not followed by a contemporaneous objection,
such error shall only be reviewed where the defendant demonstrates to an
appellate court that one of his unwaived constitutional rights was plainly violated.”
Id. Ahlers–Schaper claims that the district court erred by proceeding with trial
and not ruling on her motion to disqualify instead. (Appellant’s brief, 6-9.) She
did not, however, raise this objection at trial.

Ahlers–Schaper’s claim fails

because she cannot demonstrate fundamental error.
The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Ahlers–Schaper to
demonstrate a constitutional violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
She cannot do so because the error she claims is not constitutional—it concerns
timeframes provided by the Idaho Criminal Rules. As Ahlers–Schaper points out,
the criminal rules state that “[a]ny such disqualification for cause shall be made
by a motion to disqualify,” which can be made at any time, and that “[u]pon the
filing of a motion for disqualification, the presiding judge shall be without authority
to act further in such action except to grant or deny such motion.” I.C.R. 25(c),
(e). Thus, while the substance of a motion to disqualify could implicate Ahlers–
Schaper’s right to a fair trial and tribunal, the timing in which the court takes up
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such a motion is defined by rule, not constitution.

Because Ahlers–Schaper

cannot show that the district court’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 25 is a
constitutional violation, she has not preserved this alleged error for review.
Likewise, the second prong of the fundamental error test requires Ahlers–
Schaper to demonstrate a clear or obvious error, and she cannot do so. Perry,
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Here, it was not a clear or obvious error for
the district court to take up the motion after trial, because Ahlers–Schaper did not
properly file her motion, or even alert the court to its existence during trial.
The Idaho Criminal Rules provide that “[t]he presiding judge or magistrate
sought to be disqualified shall grant or deny the motion for disqualification upon
notice and hearing in the manner prescribed by these rules for motions.” I.C.R.
25(c) (emphasis added). Specifically, the criminal rules prescribe that written
motions, such as motions to disqualify for cause, “shall be served upon each
party and filed within the time and in the manner provided by the civil rules.”
I.C.R. 49.
The civil rules state that unless ordered otherwise by the court or specified
elsewhere in the rules, “[a] written motion, other than one which may be heard ex
parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall be filed with the court, and served
so that it is received by the parties no later than fourteen (14) days before the
time specified for hearing.” I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) (emphasis added). Lastly, the civil
rules provide the following:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of
record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney’s individual name,
whose address shall be stated before the same may be filed.
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I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Based on these requirements, it is not clear or obvious that the district
court erred by not hearing Ahlers–Schaper’s motion, because the motion was not
properly filed.

Ahlers–Schaper’s motion—written pro se despite her being

represented—was not served on the state, was not noticed up for hearing, 13 and
was never signed by her attorney. (R. vol. II, p. 232.) Per the Idaho Criminal
Rules, and the civil rules they incorporate, the district court was only required to
rule on the motion “upon notice and hearing,” and Ahlers–Schaper was further
required to serve that notice, and her motion, and have her attorney sign these
documents, all of which she did not do. Because Ahlers–Schaper’s motion was
not served, not noticed up for hearing, and was not signed by her attorney, it was
altogether improperly filed.

The district court therefore did not obviously or

clearly err by not immediately considering it; consequently, Ahlers–Schaper
cannot show the second prong of the fundamental error test.
Moreover, it is not clear in the record that the court was even aware of the
improperly filed motion to disqualify. Ahlers–Schaper filed her motion in the late
afternoon of June 9, the day after her trial began. (R. vol. II, pp. 223, 231–39.) A

13

It is unclear what Ahlers–Schaper means when she asserts in her briefing that
she “attempted to get the scheduling clerk to provide me with a hearing date for
the Motion to Disqualify for Cause, but was denied access to the Court by her
failing to provide the Appellant with a Court hearing date ….” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 7.) Ahlers–Schaper contends that “within my Motion there is a section for
Notice of Hearing in which it is noted across the page that ‘Clerk refused to
provide me with a hearing date’ and is incorporated herein by its reference.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) A review of her Motion to Disqualify for Cause filed on
June 9 shows no such notice of hearing in her motion, and there appears to be
no such evidence in the record that the court clerk refused to provide a hearing.
(R. vol. II, pp. 231-39.)
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review of the next day’s trial transcript shows no mention of the motion to
disqualify, and it is unclear whether the district court, the state, or even Ahlers–
Schaper’s own attorney had actual knowledge of the motion, as Ahlers–Schaper
never brought it up. (06/10/15 Trial Tr.) As the trial went on, Ahlers–Schaper
never addressed her motion, or raised its issues, and never mentioned the
district court’s purported inability to hear her case, despite personally testifying,
personally addressing the court, and addressing the court through counsel. (See
06/10/15 Trial Tr., p. 8, Ls. 17-25, p. 11, Ls. 12-18, p. 83, L. 14 – p. 88, L. 13.)
And it is clear from the record that Ahlers–Schaper was able to bring midtrial motions to her counsel’s attention, and did: Ahlers–Schaper’s counsel noted
on the morning of June 10 that: “My client would like to move for a continuance
because she feels that she needs Deputy Cotter from Bonner County Sheriff’s
Office to testify.” (06/10/15 Trial Tr., p. 11, Ls. 11-18.) Had Ahlers–Schaper
similarly wished for the district court to immediately address her disqualification
motion, she should have said so, or at least brought it to her counsel’s attention,
just as she did with her motion for a continuance.

The state submits that

improperly filing a mid-trial motion to disqualify, not alerting the court to its
existence, then later claiming the court should not have proceeded with trial, falls
squarely within what the Perry Court deemed “sandbagging the court, i.e.,
‘remaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the
case does not conclude in his favor.’” Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d 976.
Therefore, this claim fails on the second prong of the fundamental error test,
which is designed to prevent such an outcome.
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Lastly, Ahlers–Schaper cannot show that the district court’s decision to
hear her motion after trial affected any of her substantial rights, let alone affected
the trial. Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. The district court ultimately denied Ahlers–
Schaper’s motion, and Ahlers–Schaper shows no evidence that the district court
would have granted her motion, and appointed a different judge, had the court
only heard the motion sooner. Because Ahlers–Schaper does not show that a
quicker resolution of her motion would have resulted in the motion being granted,
changed the trial outcome, or otherwise affected her substantial rights, she
cannot meet the final requirement to show fundamental error.14
Ahlers–Schaper claims that the district court erred by not taking up her
motion to disqualify for cause, but did not make that objection at trial. Because
she cannot show that the court erred, much less committed fundamental error,
she fails to preserve that claim on appeal.
VI.
Ahlers–Schaper Is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal
Despite appearing pro se, Ahlers–Schaper requests attorney fees on
appeal. She cites I.A.R. 41(d), which allows paralegal fees to be awarded to
represented parties, and submits that:
For a great part of this case the Appellant has secured the
assistance of a paralegal/specialized legal assistant to do most of

14

Alternatively, in the event Ahlers–Schaper has preserved this issue for review
on appeal, any alleged error of the district court would be harmless for these
same reasons. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (“If the defendant
meets this burden then an appellate court shall review the error under the
harmless error test, with the defendant bearing the burden of proving there is a
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.”).
35

his[15] writing, research, and preparation of oral arguments before
the court. Appellant asserts that should he prevail on Appeal he
should be able to get attorney fees for his services as provided by
the paralegal/specialized legal assistant.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
This argument fails. No statutory authority allows for costs or attorney
fees in criminal cases, and as a result Idaho courts “presently have no authority
to award costs and attorney fees in criminal cases on appeal.”

State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856, 861, 153 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Ct. App. 2006); see also
I.C. §§ 12-120, 12-121. Even if this Court could award attorney fees in a criminal
case, Ahlers–Schaper is not represented by an attorney, and Idaho Courts “have
long held that pro se litigants are not entitled to attorney fees.”

Michalk v.

Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009). Regardless of who
wrote the appellant’s brief, her fee request—or “his” fee request—is meritless.

15

The brief-drafter—who may or may not be the appellant—loses hold of the
correct pronoun at times, which results in curious references to “his writing” and
claimed fees “should he prevail on Appeal.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (emphasis
added).) In all likelihood, these are conspicuous clues verifying Ahlers–
Schaper’s admission—or perhaps, her ghostwriter’s admission—that “most of”
the writing in this case was done by someone other than Ahlers–Schaper.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district
court.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2016.

___/s/ Kale D. Gans____
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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